State-Building and Police: Why Colonial Police Were Necessary
Overview
When the US Military Government arrived in South Korea in September 1945, they faced a critical question: Who would maintain order? The answer was controversial—they rehired the colonial police who had served under Japanese rule.
By late 1946, 82% of all police officers were former colonial-era officers. This decision secured short-term efficiency but sacrificed long-term legitimacy. Why did the USMG make this choice? And what were the consequences?
The USMG’s Dilemma
Immediate Needs
When the USMG took control, they needed to:
- Maintain public order in a society of 20 million
- Prevent looting and score-settling against Japanese
- Counter the rapidly organizing leftist forces
- Establish administrative control across the peninsula
The problem was that Americans didn’t speak Korean, didn’t understand local conditions, and had no experience in colonial administration. They needed Koreans who knew the system.
Limited Options
Who could fill these positions?
Option 1: People’s Committees – Organized across 131 counties, they had legitimacy among the people. But they were leftist-dominated and opposed to the USMG’s presence.
Option 2: Independence activists – Had moral authority but no administrative experience. Many had spent years in exile and didn’t know local conditions.
Option 3: Colonial bureaucrats – Had experience and knew the system. But they had collaborated with the Japanese and lacked popular legitimacy.
The USMG chose Option 3.
The Colonial Police System
Japanese Legacy
The colonial police had been instruments of oppression:
- Suppressed independence movements
- Enforced wartime mobilization
- Monitored “thought crimes”
- Tortured political prisoners
For many Koreans, police represented Japanese oppression itself.
USMG’s Reinstatement
In September 1945, the USMG reinstated all Korean police who had served under Japanese rule. The results:
- November 1945: About 15,000 police officers
- August 1946: About 24,000 police officers
- August 1948: About 34,000 police officers
By late 1946, 82% of all police were former colonial-era officers. At the provincial governor level and above, 65% had served in the colonial administration.
Consequences
Short-term Benefits
- Immediate operational capacity
- Knowledge of local conditions
- Established networks and intelligence
- Experience in suppressing “disorder”
Long-term Costs
- Deep popular resentment
- Legitimacy deficit for the new state
- Leftist propaganda ammunition
- Violence begetting more violence
During the fall 1946 uprisings, over 200 police were killed—partly because of accumulated hatred toward colonial-era officers.
State-building Lessons
The Efficiency-Legitimacy Trade-off
The USMG faced a classic state-building dilemma: efficiency vs. legitimacy.
Efficiency requires:
- Experienced personnel
- Established systems
- Immediate operational capacity
Legitimacy requires:
- Popular support
- Moral authority
- Clean break from the past
The USMG prioritized efficiency. This enabled rapid pacification but created lasting legitimacy problems.
Comparative Cases
2000s Iraq: The US completely dismissed Saddam’s bureaucrats (de-Ba’athification). Result: administrative collapse, state-building failure.
1990s Eastern Europe: Former communist officials were largely retained. Result: functional governments but legitimacy debates.
Post-WWII Germany: De-Nazification was initially strict but later relaxed for practical reasons. Result: functioning state with ongoing historical reckoning.
Contemporary Implications
The colonial police question remains relevant:
- How do we balance efficiency and legitimacy in state-building?
- Can former oppressors become agents of a new order?
- What are the long-term costs of prioritizing stability over justice?
South Korea eventually built a functioning democracy, but the path was marked by violence and legitimacy crises. The choice to use colonial police was not simply “wrong”—it was a trade-off with lasting consequences.
Korean State-Building Series
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