Jeju 4.3: The Darkest Shadow of State-Building

Overview

“You have to die to survive.”

In November 1948, martial law was declared on Jeju Island. The military commander designated the mid-mountain areas 5km from the coastline as “hostile territory,” and anyone within was considered a “rioter.” Villages burned, residents were forcibly relocated to the coast. Refusal meant death.

From April 3, 1948 to September 1954, at least 15,000 to 30,000 people died on Jeju Island—one-tenth of the island’s 280,000 population. Most were not guerrillas but civilians.

Why did the newborn ROK massacre its own citizens? How was this tragedy possible?

Historical Background

Why Jeju?

Jeju Island was the furthest island from the Korean Peninsula. This volcanic island, 100km from the mainland, had historically been discriminated against.

Historical marginalization:

Joseon era: Place of exile, despised as “islanders”
Japanese colonial era: Forced labor, exploitation of female divers
After liberation: Cholera epidemic, crop failure, unemployment

Post-liberation returnees:

About 60,000 returned from Japan (20% of population)
Mostly young people in their 20s-30s
Many had labor movement experience in Osaka and elsewhere
Returned home unemployed

These returning youth actively joined People’s Committees. Jeju’s People’s Committee was the strongest in South Korea, with high popular support.

1947: The Beginning of Conflict

On March 1, 1947, during a March 1st Independence Movement anniversary ceremony, demonstrators were shot by police. Six people died. In protest, a general strike paralyzed schools, government offices, and businesses across Jeju.

USMG response:

Dispatched 421 reinforcement police
Deployed hundreds of Northwest Youth
Labeled Jeju a “red island”

The arrival of the Northwest Youth was decisive. These refugees from North Korea who had lost land and family were burning for “revenge against communism.” Their violence was more ruthless than the police.

March 1947 to March 1948 (one year):

Arrested: 2,500
Deaths from torture: many (exact number unknown)
Conflict between residents and police/Northwest Youth intensified

The Trigger: May 10 Elections

In early 1948, the UN decided on separate elections for South Korea only. The South Korean Workers’ Party on Jeju defined this as “a conspiracy to divide the nation” and decided on armed uprising.

Goals of the uprising leadership:

Block the May 10 elections
Oppose separate government
Demand US military withdrawal

Armed force strength:

Core fighters: About 500
Mobilizable personnel: About 4,000
Weapons: Leftover Japanese military guns, bamboo spears, farm tools

They established bases in the mid-mountain areas of Mt. Halla (1,950m) and prepared for guerrilla warfare.

Development

The Uprising: April 3, 1948

At 2 AM, signal fires rose from peaks across Mt. Halla. This was the signal to attack.

Simultaneous attack targets:

11 police substations
Homes of rightist figures
Northwest Youth lodgings

Casualties:

Police/rightist side: 12 killed, 4 wounded
Armed guerrillas: 2 killed

First-day casualties were not heavy. The guerrillas’ goal was “election obstruction” rather than “police elimination.” But the repercussions of this uprising exceeded imagination.

May 10 Elections Derailed

On May 10, 1948, elections for the Constitutional Assembly were held.

Jeju results:

North Jeju A (1st constituency): Voter turnout below threshold → Election invalid
North Jeju B (2nd constituency): Voter turnout below threshold → Election invalid
South Jeju (3rd constituency): Election held, representative elected

Of 200 constituencies nationwide, only Jeju’s 2 constituencies failed to hold elections. The guerrillas’ primary objective was achieved.

Meaning of the derailment:

Damage to ROK government’s legitimacy
Stigma of “the region that couldn’t even hold elections”
Central government’s hostility toward Jeju intensified

Negotiation Attempts and Failure

In April-May 1948, negotiations were attempted between the military government commander and the guerrilla leader.

April 28 negotiations (Colonel Kim Ik-ryeol vs. Kim Dal-sam):

Agreed on 72-hour ceasefire
Discussed gradual guerrilla descent from mountains

Reasons for negotiation failure:

Arson incident by rightist youth groups (Ora-ri fire)
USMG’s hardline approach
Insistence on holding May 10 elections

After negotiations failed, the situation spiraled out of control.

Scorched-Earth Operations: November 1948 – March 1949

In October 1948, the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion occurred. ROK Army units that were being deployed to suppress Jeju rebelled. This shocked the Rhee government and confirmed a hardline approach toward Jeju.

On November 17, martial law was declared on Jeju.

Content of scorched-earth operations:

1. Coastal 5km restriction:

Mid-mountain villages designated “hostile territory”
All residents there considered “rioter collaborators”
Anyone not moving to the coast within 48 hours would be shot

2. Village burning:

95% of mid-mountain villages burned
About 130 villages reduced to ashes

3. Preventive detention:

Families of guerrillas and missing persons arrested
“Families of escapees” executed

Massacre sites:

“Soldiers stormed the village and set fire to every house. Those who ran were shot. My mother was shot dead running out of the burning house.”
— Survivor testimony

Jeongchon Village (January 17, 1949):

139 villagers massacred
Pregnant women, elderly, children killed indiscriminately
Entire village burned

Bukchon-ri (January 17, 1949):

About 400 villagers massacred
More than half the village population
Mass execution at the elementary school grounds

Role of the Northwest Youth

The Northwest Youth Association led the scorched-earth operations.

Jeju deployment scale: Hundreds to over a thousand (estimated)

Roles:

Village searches and “red” identification
Interrogation and torture
Execution
Police and military auxiliary

Reasons for brutality:

Trauma from North Korea (land reform, religious persecution)
Ideology of “revenge against communists”
Absence of legal controls
Central government’s tacit approval

For the Northwest Youth members, Jeju residents were “the same reds.” The fear and anger they experienced in North Korea exploded on Jeju.

Scale of Damage

Human casualties (estimated):

Deaths: 25,000-30,000
About 10% of Jeju’s population (280,000)
80% of massacre victims killed by suppression forces (military, police, Northwest Youth)
Damage by guerrillas: About 20%

Village damage:

Villages burned: About 130 (95% of mid-mountain)
Houses destroyed: 39,285

Period: April 3, 1948 to September 21, 1954 (when Mt. Halla access ban was lifted)

State-building Analysis

1. When State Apparatus Destroys Society

Jeju 4.3 shows the paradox of state-building. In the process of building the state, the state destroyed society.

Logic of scorched-earth operations:

To isolate guerrillas, civilians must be separated
Civilians who cooperate are considered guerrillas
When in doubt, kill

This was Mao Zedong’s guerrilla theory applied in reverse. If “guerrillas are fish, the people are the sea,” then drain the sea to catch the fish.

But that “sea” was its own citizens.

2. Outsourcing Violence and Avoiding Responsibility

The USMG and Rhee government outsourced violence.

Outsourcing structure:

US military: Planned operations, provided weapons, avoided direct involvement
ROK Army: Executed scorched-earth operations
Police: Preventive detention, executions
Northwest Youth: Most brutal field violence

In this structure, final responsibility becomes unclear. The US could claim “we weren’t directly involved,” the army could say “we just followed orders,” and the Northwest Youth could call it “patriotic activity.”

The dispersion of responsibility enabled the expansion of massacre.

3. The Power of Ideology

The label “red” justified massacre.

Dehumanization:

Jeju residents = “reds” = not human beings
“Reds can be killed”
No need to distinguish civilians from guerrillas

This is the terror of ideology. Ordinary people could become killers because they believed “the other side is not human.”

The Northwest Youth members were not evil people. They too were victims who suffered in North Korea. But when victims become perpetrators, violence chains together.

4. The Price of State-Building

Jeju 4.3 shows the price of ROK state-building.

Rhee government’s calculation:

Government stability impossible without Jeju suppression
Complete elimination of remaining leftist forces needed
Civilian casualties are “unavoidable sacrifice”

Actual results:

Guerrillas nearly eliminated (mid-1949)
But 30,000 civilians dead
Jeju residents’ trauma (decades of silence)
“Red” stigma and guilt by association applied

The state was built. But that state remained as a memory of violence for Jeju residents.

Contemporary Implications

1. The Journey of Confronting the Past

Jeju 4.3 is a touchstone for Korean historical reckoning.

2000: Jeju 4.3 Special Act enacted

2003: President Roh Moo-hyun’s first state apology

2006: April 3 designated as national memorial day

2018: President Moon Jae-in attended 70th anniversary ceremony

2021: Additional victims officially recognized (still ongoing)

But debates continue:

Was it a “riot” or an “uprising”?
How should we remember the guerrillas’ violence?
What about the Northwest Youth and perpetrator punishment?

2. State Violence and Memory

“History that is not remembered repeats.”

Jeju 4.3 was taboo for a long time. Survivors kept silent, afraid of being labeled “reds.” They couldn’t even tell their children.

Only after democratization in 1987 did the truth-finding movement begin. And after 50 years, the state apologized.

The meaning of memory:

Honor for victims
Reflection on the structure of perpetration
Lessons to prevent repetition

3. Universal Lessons

Jeju 4.3 is not just a Korean tragedy.

Similar cases:

Indonesian communist massacre (1965-66): 500,000-1,000,000
Cambodian Killing Fields (1975-79): 1.7-2.5 million
Rwandan genocide (1994): 800,000

Common elements:

Dehumanization through ideology
Organized violence by state apparatus
Civilian massacre
Truth-finding after long silence

The state can kill its citizens. This is the most frightening lesson Jeju 4.3 teaches.

Korean State-Building Series

◀ Previous: [Korea 4] 1948: The Legitimacy Crisis of the Newborn Republic

[Korea 5] Jeju 4.3: The Darkest Shadow of State-Building