The Fall of 1946: Leftist Uprisings and Syngman Rhee’s Choice
Overview
On September 23, 1946, 8,000 railway workers in Busan went on strike. What began as a simple labor dispute escalated into a nationwide leftist uprising within just two months, killing over 200 police officers and nearly 1,000 civilians. The US Military Government assessed at one point that three-quarters of South Korea’s population was under communist control.
This was the first major state-building crisis in post-liberation South Korea. Amid weak state apparatus, powerful social forces, and competing political leaders, how did the nascent South Korea overcome this crisis? And why was Syngman Rhee able to seize political initiative in this process?
Historical Background
Liberation and the USMG’s Dilemma
When Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, the southern part of the Korean Peninsula came under US military occupation. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commander of the US 24th Corps, arrived in Seoul on September 9 to take over military government and administration, but faced serious problems.
Personnel shortage: As of October 1946, the USMG had only 3,721 personnel, with Americans comprising less than half. Even including Korean employees, the total was only 11,400—less than one-third of the Japanese Government-General’s 160,000 staff.
Lack of legitimacy: The USMG recognized neither the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing nor the Korean People’s Republic in Seoul. Yet it lacked the capacity to run the country independently. The solution the USMG chose was to rehire pro-Japanese bureaucrats.
In September 1945, the USMG reinstated all Korean police who had served under Japanese rule. By late 1946, 82% of all police were former colonial-era officers. 65% of high-ranking officials at the provincial governor level or above also had careers in the colonial administration. The price of efficiency was the loss of legitimacy.
The Rise of Leftist Forces
Immediately after liberation, People’s Committees were organized across the country. They filled the administrative vacuum left by the Japanese and effectively served as local governments. By November 1945, People’s Committees had been established in 12 cities and 131 counties in South Korea. The USMG itself acknowledged them as “the most powerful and active organization in South Korea.”
Moreover, the organization of workers and peasants progressed rapidly:
- National Council of Korean Labor Unions: 570,000 members by August 1946 (mining, railways, construction, chemicals)
- National Federation of Peasant Unions: 3 million members across North and South Korea (demanding rent reduction and land redistribution)
The USMG relied on pro-Japanese bureaucrats while the leftists organized the masses. Conflict was inevitable.
Development
September: The Strike Begins
On September 23, 1946, 8,000 railway workers in Busan went on strike. Led by the National Council of Korean Labor Unions, the strike soon spread to major infrastructure industries including railways, electricity, and telecommunications. Their demand was clear: “The USMG must withdraw and transfer administrative power to the People’s Committees.”
The USMG began forceful suppression in Seoul and Incheon from September 30, arresting strike leaders and threatening to deploy military force. However, the flames spread southward instead.
October: Explosion in Gyeongsang Province
In early October, riots broke out in Daegu, the capital of North Gyeongsang Province. Nearly 40 police officers were killed, and the provincial governor’s residence was attacked. In surrounding counties, county chiefs and police chiefs were kidnapped or killed. The USMG’s control virtually collapsed in the North Gyeongsang region.
In Busan and surrounding cities in South Gyeongsang, public officials and police were attacked. Dozens of casualties occurred.
November: Spread to Jeolla Province
In early November, the uprising moved to Jeolla Province. The USMG estimated that 65,000 people participated in the armed uprising in South Jeolla alone. In Jeonju, over 400 prisoners escaped.
Final casualties (September-November 1946):
- Police deaths: Over 200
- Civilian deaths: Nearly 1,000
- Arrested: Over 16,000
Suppression: Combining Coercion and Conciliation
The USMG employed two strategies simultaneously.
Coercion (Hawk):
- Deployment of police forces and declaration of martial law
- Cooperation with rightist youth organizations: Korean Democratic Youth League (April 1946, sponsored by Rhee), Northwest Youth Association (August 1946, North Korean refugees), Korean National Youth (October 1946, Lee Beom-seok, USMG support)
- Harsh torture and interrogation
Thousands of rightist youth, armed with guns and grenades, assisted the police. Their violence was more ruthless than the police, and leftists feared the youth groups more than the police.
Conciliation (Dove):
- Strengthened punishment for rice smuggling and corrupt officials (fines increased 50-fold)
- Working hour limits (48 hours per week + 12 hours overtime)
- Consideration of rent reduction
The USMG’s first Military Governor, Major General Archibald V. Arnold, worried that “this rebellion will significantly set back America’s plans for South Korea.” By mid-October, even South Korea’s first democratic election for the Interim Legislative Assembly was at risk of postponement. However, the USMG ultimately succeeded in suppressing the uprising by late November through a combination of coercion and conciliation.
State-building Analysis
1. Political Leadership: Rhee’s Rise
Until the fall of 1946, Kim Kyu-sik held political initiative in South Korea. An independence activist educated in America, Kim was the leader most favored by the USMG and Washington. Fluent in English, Christian, and flexible on left-right cooperation, he received 3 million won in funding and even secret meeting places from the USMG.
However, Kim’s response to the leftist uprising was passive. He and Yeo Un-hyeong demanded “purge of pro-Japanese police” and “cancellation of the legislative assembly election” from the USMG, but were rejected. On October 26, they merely issued a joint statement appealing for “national unity and return to normalcy.”
Syngman Rhee, in contrast, moved actively:
- Mid-September: Speaking tour in southern regions (Daegu, Busan)
- October: Presented his mediation proposal to the USMG
- November: Strengthened political position after uprising suppression
- December: Secured Washington’s support through US visit
General Arnold had previously evaluated Rhee as “completely selfish,” but changed his position after the uprising. He judged that Rhee’s anti-communist line and strong leadership were necessary.
2. Bureaucratic Apparatus: A Weak State
The USMG’s bureaucratic apparatus was weak both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Quantitative shortage:
- USMG personnel: 3,721 (less than half American)
- US troops stationed in provinces: 70-400 per province
- One company in North Gyeongsang covered 12 counties
Qualitative problems:
- 82% pro-Japanese police → lack of legitimacy
- US officers who couldn’t speak Korean
- No experience in local administration
Ultimately, state apparatus alone could not suppress the leftist uprising. The USMG had no choice but to rely on social forces.
3. Social Forces: Left vs. Right
Leftist strengths:
- People’s Committees: de facto local governments (131 counties)
- Labor unions: 570,000 members
- Peasant unions: 3 million members
- Organizational and mobilization capacity
Emergence of rightist forces:
- Korean Democratic Youth League (April 1946): Seoul gangster organization, Rhee’s sponsorship, cooperation with police
- Northwest Youth Association (August 1946): North Korean refugees in their 20s-30s, extreme anti-communism, Rhee’s associates as leaders
- Korean National Youth (October 1946): Led by Lee Beom-seok, 5 million won from USMG
Rightist youth groups, numbering 2,000-3,000 with guns and grenades, attacked leftists. They were more brutal than police, committing kidnapping, torture, and murder. Yet the USMG tacitly approved and supported them. When the state is weak, social forces make the state.
4. Foreign Powers: America’s Dilemma
The USMG faced the following dilemmas:
- Legitimacy vs. Efficiency: Rehiring pro-Japanese collaborators
- Democracy vs. Stability: Forceful suppression vs. holding elections
- Left-Right cooperation vs. Anti-communism: Kim Kyu-sik vs. Syngman Rhee
Ultimately, America chose anti-communist stability. After November 1946, the US shifted from left-right cooperation toward establishing a separate government centered on Syngman Rhee.
Contemporary Implications
1. State-building Involves Violence
South Korea’s state-building was not peaceful. Over 200 police and nearly 1,000 civilians died. Over 16,000 were arrested. The violence of rightist youth groups was more ruthless than state violence.
Today we take “rule of law” and “democracy” for granted, but their foundation was built with blood in the fall of 1946.
2. Social Forces Make the State
In 1946, South Korea’s state apparatus was too weak. The USMG could not suppress the leftist uprising without rightist youth groups. Without the Northwest Youth Association, the Korean Democratic Youth League, and the Korean National Youth, South Korea’s state-building might have failed.
However, these social forces later became problems by escaping state control. They played key roles in suppressing the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion in 1948 and in maintaining Rhee’s dictatorship in the 1950s.
3. The Importance of Political Leadership
Kim Kyu-sik was America’s preference, but was ineffective in crisis. Kim Koo had high prestige but didn’t act. Syngman Rhee was distrusted by America but moved actively.
Ultimately, Rhee becoming South Korea’s first president was because of his choices in the fall of 1946. Crisis is opportunity. Political leaders are made in crisis.
4. The Price of Efficiency Without Legitimacy
The USMG gained short-term efficiency by rehiring pro-Japanese police but lost long-term legitimacy. This dilemma repeats today.
- 2000s Iraq: Complete dismissal of Saddam regime officials → administrative paralysis → state-building failure
- 1990s Eastern Europe: Utilizing communist officials → securing efficiency → legitimacy controversy
How to balance legitimacy and efficiency? South Korea in 1946 chose efficiency, and the results are complex.
Timeline
1945.08.15 Japan surrenders, Liberation 1945.09.09 US 24th Corps arrives in Seoul, USMG begins 1945.09.12 People's Committees begin forming (131 counties by November) 1946.04 Korean Democratic Youth League founded (Rhee's sponsorship) 1946.08 Northwest Youth Association founded (North Korean refugees) 1946.09.23 Busan railway workers' strike begins 1946.09.30 USMG begins suppression in Seoul and Incheon 1946.10.01 Daegu riots (40 police killed) 1946.10.09 Korean National Youth founded (Lee Beom-seok, USMG 5 million won) 1946.11.01 Jeolla uprising (65,000 participants in South Jeolla) 1946.11.30 Uprising suppression completed 1946.12 Rhee secures support through US visit
Korean State-Building Series
▶ Next: [Korea 2] The Birth of Korean Rightists: How the Northwest Youth Association Was Created