[Korea 4] 1948: The Legitimacy Crisis of the Newborn Republic

1948: The Legitimacy Crisis of the Newborn Republic

Overview

On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was established. But the celebrations didn’t last long. Two months later in October, two regiments of the ROK Army stationed in Yeosu rebelled. Leftist officers seized command and declared they “do not recognize the ROK government.” Over 500 police were killed, and rebels retreated to Mt. Jiri to wage guerrilla warfare.

Even before that, in April, an armed uprising in Jeju Island had derailed the May 10 general election. The newborn ROK faced a legitimacy crisis from its very birth.

Where did this crisis come from? And how did the Rhee government overcome it?

Historical Background

The Dilemma of Separate Elections

In November 1947, the UN General Assembly resolved to hold general elections throughout the Korean Peninsula. But when the Soviet Union refused UN observers in North Korea, the UN decided in February 1948 to hold elections only in “accessible areas”—that is, South Korea under the USMG.

This decision split South Korean politics.

Supporters (Rhee’s camp):

  • “Let’s establish a government in the South first”
  • “Unification can come after establishing the South Korean government”
  • Separate election → Separate government → Northern expedition for unification

Opponents (Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik’s camp):

  • “Elections only in the South mean permanent division”
  • “We must negotiate with the North”
  • Visit to Pyongyang in April 1948, attempted North-South negotiations

Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik were the president and vice president of the Korean Provisional Government. Their election boycott was a serious blow to the new government’s legitimacy.

Jeju’s Special Circumstances

Jeju Island had the strongest leftist support in South Korea.

People’s Committee support rate: 70-80% of total population (estimated)

Background:

  • Historical discrimination: Looked down upon as “islanders” by mainlanders
  • Economic poverty: Barren volcanic island
  • Distinct culture: Different dialect and customs from mainland
  • 60,000 returnees after liberation: Young people returning from Japan

From 1947, the Northwest Youth Association was dispatched to Jeju to suppress leftists. The violence of these North Korean refugees angered Jeju residents. Hostility toward police and the Northwest Youth became fertile ground for the leftist uprising.

Development

Jeju 4.3: Stop the Election (April 1948)

At dawn on April 3, 1948, about 4,000 armed guerrillas led by the South Korean Workers’ Party Jeju branch simultaneously attacked police stations and rightist figures.

Goals of the uprising:

  1. Block the May 10 general election
  2. Oppose separate government establishment
  3. Establish a unified government

The guerrillas established bases in the mid-mountain areas of Mt. Halla and waged guerrilla warfare. In the May 10 election, 2 of Jeju’s 3 constituencies failed to hold elections because voter turnout didn’t reach the required threshold.

This wasn’t just a security problem. The legitimacy of the election itself was shaken.

Establishment of the ROK Government (August 15, 1948)

While the Jeju uprising continued, the Constitutional Assembly opened on May 31, the constitution was promulgated on July 17, Syngman Rhee was elected as the first president on July 20, and the ROK government was officially launched on August 15.

But the new government’s foundation was fragile.

Cracks in legitimacy:

  • Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik: Election boycott, government non-participation
  • Jeju Island: 2 constituencies without elected representatives
  • Within the National Assembly: Conflict between the Korea Democratic Party and Rhee
  • Within the military: Remaining leftist elements

Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion: The Military Betrays (October 1948)

On October 19, 1948, the ROK Army’s 14th Regiment stationed in Yeosu rebelled. They had received orders to deploy to Jeju for suppression, but leftist officers within the regiment seized command.

The rebels’ claims:

  • “We refuse deployment to massacre compatriots”
  • “Down with pro-Japanese police”
  • “We do not recognize the ROK government”

The rebels occupied Yeosu and Suncheon and revived People’s Committees. Over 500 police were killed. The rebellion spread to neighboring areas, with parts of South Jeolla and South Gyeongsang briefly under rebel control.

Why this was dangerous:

  • Not a police uprising but a military rebellion
  • Occurred just 2 months after government establishment
  • Message that “even the military doesn’t recognize the government”

Suppression and UN Recognition (November-December 1948)

The Rhee government mobilized all efforts to suppress the rebellions.

Yeosu-Suncheon suppression (late October):

  • Two ROK Army brigades deployed
  • US military advisors supported operations
  • Yeosu recaptured in 10 days
  • Remaining forces moved to Mt. Jiri, continued guerrilla warfare

Jeju scorched-earth operations (November onwards):

  • Forced evacuation of mid-mountain villages
  • Travel prohibited beyond 5km from the coast
  • Mass civilian casualties (minimum 15,000)

Decisive turning point: UN Recognition (December 12)

The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 195, recognizing the ROK government as “the only lawful government” in Korea. 48 in favor, 6 against (Soviet bloc), 1 abstention.

Effects of this recognition:

  • Secured international legitimacy
  • Even Kim Koo welcomed it as “a great historical achievement”
  • Weakened the opposition’s justification
  • Strengthened the Rhee government’s political position

State-building Analysis

1. Political Leadership: Rhee’s Crisis Management

As in the 1946 leftist uprisings, Rhee moved actively during the crisis.

Cabinet composition strategy:

  • 5 Korea Democratic Party (opposition) members included → coalition form
  • Lee Beom-seok of Korean National Youth as Prime Minister → unifying rightist youth groups
  • Former communist Cho Bong-am as Agriculture Minister → gesture toward leftist inclusion

Utilizing UN recognition:

  • Immediately after December recognition, compromised with Korea Democratic Party
  • Appointed Korea Democratic Party member as Vice Minister of Interior → appeased opposition
  • Secured legitimacy as “government recognized by international community”

2. Bureaucratic Apparatus: A Strengthened State

Unlike 1946, the state apparatus in 1948 was much stronger.

Police:

  • November 1945: About 15,000
  • August 1946: About 24,000
  • August 1948: About 34,000

Military:

  • 1946: Korean Constabulary about 20,000
  • 1948: ROK Army about 50,000

Local administration:

  • October 1946: 41,000 local civil servants
  • November 1947: 92,000 local civil servants (more than doubled)

The quantitative growth of state apparatus made suppression operations possible.

3. Social Forces: Light and Shadow of the Northwest Youth

The Northwest Youth Association again led the suppression.

Jeju deployment:

  • Hundreds dispatched from 1947
  • Role as police auxiliaries
  • Leftist identification and “preventive detention”

Brutal suppression:

  • Massacred civilians, not just guerrillas
  • Executed people as “families of reds”
  • Participated in scorched-earth destruction of mid-mountain villages

Suppression would have been impossible without the Northwest Youth. But the price was mass civilian slaughter. This is the dark side of state-building.

4. Foreign Powers: The Decisive Role of UN Recognition

The US played a dual role.

Military support:

  • US military advisors planned operations
  • Provided weapons and ammunition
  • Did not engage in direct combat (avoiding responsibility)

Political support:

  • Led ROK recognition at UN General Assembly
  • Co-sponsored Resolution 195 (US, ROC, Australia)

UN recognition was a game changer. As ROK legitimacy was affirmed domestically and internationally, the opposition’s justification disappeared. Even Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik, who had boycotted the election, welcomed the UN recognition.

Contemporary Implications

1. Where Does Legitimacy Come From?

The newborn ROK experienced two types of legitimacy crises.

Domestic legitimacy crisis:

  • Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik’s non-participation
  • Failed Jeju elections
  • Military rebellion

Solutions:

  • UN recognition (international legitimacy)
  • Strong suppression (domestic control)
  • Compromise with opposition (political coalition)

Legitimacy doesn’t fall from the sky. It is created.

2. The Violence of State-Building

At least 20,000 people died in the suppression of Jeju 4.3 and the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion. Most were civilians.

This shows the inherent violence of state-building. The state is “the monopoly of legitimate violence.” In the process of establishing that monopoly, illegitimate violence may be mobilized.

The ROK we enjoy today was built on this violence. Remembering this fact is the starting point for coming to terms with the past.


Korean State-Building Series

◀ Previous: [Korea 3] State-Building and Police: Why Colonial Police Were Necessary

▶ Next: [Korea 5] Jeju 4.3: The Darkest Shadow of State-Building

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top