Is US-China War Inevitable? The Truth and Myths of the Thucydides Trap
Overview
In the 5th century BCE, Greek historian Thucydides diagnosed the cause of the Peloponnesian War:
“What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”
Twenty-four hundred years later, this sentence has become the most famous metaphor for US-China relations. Harvard professor Graham Allison coined it the “Thucydides Trap.” Is conflict inevitable when a rising power (China) challenges an established hegemon (United States)?
This article examines where the Thucydides Trap metaphor originated, what policy recommendations it contains, and why it faces criticism.
Historical Background: Athens and Sparta
The Ancient Context
In the 5th century BCE, Athens emerged victorious from the Persian Wars and grew rapidly as leader of the Delian League. Accumulating wealth through naval power and commerce, Athens increasingly displayed imperial ambitions. Meanwhile, Sparta, a land-based military power, sought to preserve the existing order as head of the Peloponnesian League.
Tensions between the two powers finally exploded into war in 431 BCE. The Peloponnesian War lasted 27 years and proved catastrophic for both sides. Athens was defeated, and victorious Sparta also declined.
Thucydides’s Analysis
Thucydides, an Athenian general and historian, interpreted the war’s causes “structurally.” When a rising power threatens an established one, hubris develops in the former and paranoia in the latter. This psychological dynamic makes war “inevitable.”
Modern Application: The United States and China
Allison’s “Thucydides Trap”
Harvard Kennedy School professor Allison popularized this concept through a 2015 Atlantic article and his 2017 book Destined for War. His Belfer Center research team analyzed 16 cases over the past 500 years where rising powers confronted established hegemons. The results were striking: 12 of 16 cases ended in war.
Allison warns that China’s rise and America’s relative decline are creating the most dangerous structural tension in history.
Policy Recommendations
Allison and his colleagues recommend the following for the United States:
- Prioritize Core Interests: Don’t try to intervene everywhere. Clarify what truly matters.
- Understand the Adversary’s Logic: Grasp the fundamental motivations behind Chinese actions. Don’t simply interpret them as “malice.”
- Maintain Predictability: Ensure foreign policy consistency to reduce miscalculation.
- Address Domestic Problems: Heal declining democracy and a divided society.
Scholars like Moore add: clarify red lines while guaranteeing no pursuit of regime change.
Critiques: The Limits of Historical Analogy
Critique 1: Historical Inadequacy
Did the Peloponnesian War really occur because of “structural power shifts”? Many ancient historians argue that Athens’s imperial expansion—particularly its exploitation and coercion of allies—triggered the war. Sparta responded to Athenian behavior, not merely Athenian “growth.”
Joseph Nye observes: “It was not Athenian power but Athenian policy that was the problem.”
Critique 2: Contemporary Inadequacy
China is not Athens. Athens was a maritime democracy; China is a continental authoritarian state. Athenian empire rested on ally exploitation; China’s rise is based on global economic integration.
America is not Sparta. Sparta was an insular land power; America is an open maritime and air power. Sparta was in economic decline; America remains the world’s largest economy.
Nuclear weapons exist. This is the most decisive difference. In the age of mutually assured destruction (MAD), great power total war is fundamentally different from the Peloponnesian War.
Critique 3: The Danger of Analogy
Historical analogies can mislead policy. Schweller argues the current situation is “a new world that cannot be explained by historical analogy.” The combination of economic interdependence, information revolution, and nuclear deterrence is unlike any previous era.
State-Building Analysis
The Thucydides Trap debate is also illuminating from a state-building perspective.
- Political Leadership: How do Xi Jinping’s and successive U.S. presidents’ perceptions and choices amplify or mitigate structural pressures?
- Bureaucratic Apparatus: How do the bureaucratic interests of the military, foreign ministry, and intelligence agencies influence policy?
- Social Forces: How does nationalist public opinion in both countries constrain leaders’ options?
- International Environment: What role do allies (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan vs. Russia, North Korea) play?
Even if structural tensions exist, war is not “inevitable” but depends on actors’ choices.
Contemporary Implications: A View from the Korean Peninsula
South Korea stands at the front line of US-China competition. What lessons does the Thucydides Trap debate offer?
- Structural tensions are real. US-China conflict doesn’t simply stem from leaders’ “misunderstandings.”
- But war is not inevitable. As Cold War US-Soviet relations showed, great powers in the nuclear age have strong incentives to avoid “hot war.”
- South Korea has room to maneuver. As a middle power, it can maintain relationships with both sides and play a role in promoting peace.
Conclusion: History Is Not Destiny
Timeline:
431 BCE - Peloponnesian War begins
404 BCE - Athens surrenders, war ends
2012 - Xi Jinping takes power, US-China tensions intensify
2015 - Allison popularizes "Thucydides Trap" concept
2017 - Publication of "Destined for War"
2018 - US-China trade war begins
The Thucydides Trap is a powerful warning. Historically, tensions between rising and established powers have been dangerous. But we must not mistake analogy for destiny.
Thucydides himself did not simply say war was “inevitable.” He recorded how foolish politicians, arrogant imperialism, and democratic vulnerabilities brought catastrophe. Choices, not structures, make history.
Whether the United States and China can avoid the Peloponnesian tragedy depends on choices made by leaders and citizens of both nations. And for those of us living on the Korean Peninsula, the consequences of those choices are fateful.
Recommended Resources:
- Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (2017)
- Joseph Nye, “The Kindleberger Trap,” Project Syndicate (2017)
- Richard Ned Lebow & Benjamin Valentino, “Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory,” International Relations (2009)
- Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War
References
- Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. Google Books
- Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center. “Thucydides Trap.” Belfer Center
- Wikipedia. “Thucydides Trap.” Wikipedia