Diem’s Divide and Conquer: The Art of Separating Enemies
Introduction: A Weak Man’s Survival Strategy
“Don’t face all your enemies at once. Pick them off one by one.”
In the summer of 1954, Ngo Dinh Diem faced a desperate situation:
His enemies:
- General Hinh: Army commander-in-chief, preparing a coup
- Cao Dai: 30,000-strong army
- Hoa Hao: 10,000-strong army
- Binh Xuyen: Controlled the Saigon police
Diem’s assets:
- A nominal prime minister title
- America’s ambiguous support
- Family and a few loyalists
- That’s it
Odds of survival: Nearly 0%
Yet Diem survived. How? Through divide and rule—a classic but meticulously executed strategy.
This article dissects Diem’s strategy step by step. The political art of how the weak can defeat the strong—its concrete methodology.
1. Phase 1: Situation Analysis – Understanding the Enemy Structure
Diem’s First Question: “Are my enemies truly united?”
Surface-level solidarity:
- Hinh, religious militias, Binh Xuyen = “Anti-Diem coalition”
- Common goal: Remove Diem
- September 1954: Regular meetings
But Diem identified the cracks:
Crack 1: Diverging Interests
| Faction | True Objective |
|---|---|
| Hinh | Maintain French influence + military dictatorship |
| Cao Dai | Autonomy in Tay Ninh Province |
| Hoa Hao | Autonomy in Mekong Delta |
| Binh Xuyen | Saigon police control + monopoly on criminal enterprises |
Key insight:
- Common goal (removing Diem) = weak bond
- Individual interests = strong bond
- Coalition = fragile
Crack 2: Mutual Distrust
Cao Dai vs. Hoa Hao:
- Same “religious forces” but rivals
- Overlapping territories
- Historical conflicts
Religious forces vs. Binh Xuyen:
- Religion vs. criminal organization
- Value conflicts
- Mutual contempt
Hinh vs. Religious forces:
- Military vs. civilian militias
- Pro-French vs. nationalist
Diem’s insight:
“They hate me, but they trust each other even less.”
2. Phase 2: Breaking the Coalition – The Art of Cabinet Reshuffling
September 24, 1954: Lightning Cabinet Reshuffle
Just before Hinh’s coup plot materialized, Diem suddenly reshuffled his cabinet.
Strategic Appointments
Co-opting Cao Dai:
- Nguyen Thanh Phuong: National Defense Council member
- Nguyen Manh Bao: Social Affairs Minister
- Pham Xuan Thai: Information Minister
Co-opting Hoa Hao:
- Tran Van Soai: National Defense Council member
- Nguyen Cong Hau: Agriculture Minister
- Huynh Van Nhiem: Deputy Interior Minister
- Luong Trong Tuong: Deputy Economy Minister
Excluding Binh Xuyen:
- Le Van Vien: No position offered
Why Was This Genius?
Effect 1: Isolating Hinh
Before:
- Hinh + religious militias alliance
After:
- Religious militias: Government ministers
- Hinh: Alone
Psychology of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders:
- “We’re now on the National Defense Council”
- “We can now intervene in military personnel decisions”
- “Hinh? He could become our subordinate”
Hinh’s frustration (actual quote):
“Religious sect leaders are demanding military records and interfering in purely military affairs.”
Effect 2: Providing the Illusion of Power
Diem actually had almost no power. But he staged it as if he had plenty to share.
The meaning of ministerial positions:
- No real authority (French and Americans held actual control)
- But prestige and symbolism
- For religious forces: feeling of “being recognized”
Psychological warfare:
- “Diem needs us”
- “We are now masters of the nation”
- Reality: Diem pulled them into government to control them
Effect 3: Driving a Wedge Between Religion and Crime
Why was Binh Xuyen excluded?
Diem’s calculation:
- Binh Xuyen = criminal organization
- Religious forces pride themselves on “morality”
- If treated equally → religious forces feel insulted
- If treated differently → automatic alliance breaks
Result:
- Cao Dai and Hoa Hao: “We’re different from those gangsters”
- Binh Xuyen: Enraged at being excluded
- Coalition: Cracked
3. Phase 3: Individual Neutralization – The American Card
Hinh: Military Coup Threat
Hinh’s strength:
- Commander of Vietnamese National Army
- French backing
- Coup capability
Diem’s response:
- Could not defeat Hinh directly
- Instead, approached the Americans
Diem to U.S.:
- “Hinh is a French puppet”
- “A Hinh government means French return”
- “Only I can be America’s partner”
American decision:
- Secretary Dulles: “We support Diem”
- Warning to Hinh: “A coup means aid cutoff”
- Pressure on France: “Remove Hinh”
Result:
- November 1954: Hinh exiled to France
- Diem’s first major victory
Cao Dai and Hoa Hao: Integration Through Money
After isolating Hinh, Diem focused on the religious armies.
The money strategy:
- American aid → Diem’s hands
- Religious armies: Always short on funds
- Diem: “Join the national army, receive regular pay”
Integration process:
- January 1955: Cao Dai Trinh Minh The’s forces integrated
- February 1955: Hoa Hao Tran Van Soai’s forces integrated
- Condition: Loyalty to Diem
Those who refused:
- Some Hoa Hao leaders: Remained defiant
- Diem’s response: Wait, then strike
4. Phase 4: Final Confrontation – Binh Xuyen War
March 1955: Inevitable Clash
Binh Xuyen: The last major enemy
- Not co-opted
- Controlled Saigon police
- Casino and opium monopoly
- 5,000 armed fighters
Conflict trigger:
- Diem revokes police control
- Binh Xuyen: “This means war”
- Bao Dai (from France): “Maintain status quo”
The Decisive Battle
April 28, 1955: Battle of Saigon begins
Diem’s forces:
- Loyal national army units
- Integrated Cao Dai forces
- American support (covert)
48-hour battle:
- Street fighting in Saigon
- Binh Xuyen pushed to Cholon
- Final defeat: Binh Xuyen retreats to swamps
Result:
- Binh Xuyen: Destroyed as political force
- Le Van Vien: Fled to France
- Diem: Master of Saigon
5. Analysis: Principles of Divide and Conquer
Principle 1: Find the Cracks
- No coalition is perfectly united
- Individual interests always differ
- Find and exploit these differences
Principle 2: Isolate the Strongest First
- Hinh was the most immediate threat
- By co-opting his allies, he was left alone
- Alone, he could be handled
Principle 3: Use External Power
- Diem was weak internally
- But he had American backing
- External support compensated for internal weakness
Principle 4: Timing is Everything
- Cabinet reshuffle: Before Hinh could act
- Integration offers: When religious forces were wavering
- Binh Xuyen war: After all other enemies neutralized
Conclusion: Lessons for State-Building
Diem’s 1954-1955 survival demonstrates a crucial truth about state-building:
You don’t need to be stronger than all your enemies combined.
You need to ensure they never combine against you.
This is the essence of divide and conquer—not just a tactic, but a survival strategy for weak states facing multiple threats.
Diem succeeded brilliantly in this phase. But as we’ll see in later articles, the same skills that saved him would eventually trap him in isolation, unable to build the broad coalitions a stable state requires.
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